University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Honors Theses and Capstones

Student Scholarship

Spring 2018

Data Breaches in Higher Education Institutions
Samantha Mello
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/honors
Part of the Business Intelligence Commons

Recommended Citation
Mello, Samantha, "Data Breaches in Higher Education Institutions" (2018). Honors Theses and Capstones.
400.
https://scholars.unh.edu/honors/400

This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of
New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses and Capstones by an
authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please
contact Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

Data Breaches in Higher Education Institutions
Prepared by: Samantha Mello
Advised by: Professor Kholekile Gwebu
Spring 2018

Table of Contents

Introduction. .................................................................................................................................. 3
Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 4
Hypothesis Development ............................................................................................................ 10
Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 12
Findings........................................................................................................................................ 13
Future Research .......................................................................................................................... 27
References .................................................................................................................................... 29

2

Introduction.
In today’s rapidly evolving technological world, data security is among the top priorities
for all types of businesses and institutions. Holding an immense amount of personal data can
pose a large threat to any type of institution in the form of a data breach. Data breaches come in
many forms such as payment card fraud, hacking or malware, insider breach, physical document
loss, portable device breach, stationary device breach, or unintended disclosures (Data Breaches
n.d.). This study explores data breaches in higher education institutions. From a data security
perspective, such institutions are important because they hold vast amounts of data belonging to
a large portion of the population. In fact, the National Center of Education Statistics reports that
higher education institutions enroll approximately 20.4 million students (NCES, 2017a) and 1.6
million faculty (NCES, 2017b). In many cases, while in college, students begin to prepare
themselves, financially, for the rest of their lives. They apply for jobs, rent apartments, and
purchase vehicles. Such endeavors require financial stability, therefore, having personal data
stolen could be detrimental.

Educational institution data breaches have not been fully explored and consequently, pose
many unanswered questions. Research on higher education data breaches is important as it has
the potential to identify factors that make such institutions more prone to data breaches.
Additionally, given significant losses associated with breaches and educational institutions’
inevitable vulnerability to such incidents, understanding how to effectively manage and recover
from a breach is likely to be of importance to educational institutions.

To study data breaches in higher education, analysis was conducted on 604 breach
announcements between 2005 and 2007, having been made public by Privacy Rights
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Clearinghouse. These breached announcements were then merged with College Scorecard data to
help identify factors that lead to breaches. Once merged, statistical analysis was performed to
gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between the factors.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The next section reviews the extant
literature and identifies some of the gaps that this study intends to fill. Thereafter, a set of
hypotheses are developed followed by a description of the methodology used to collect, clean,
and analyze the data. Next, the findings and their implications are discussed. Finally, avenues for
future research are presented.

Literature Review
The literature considers work that has been conducted on data breaches from a variety of
industries including healthcare, corporate (often referred to as business), government and the
education sector. This approach was adopted to permit the identification of gaps in the data
breach literature. Each research paper was categorized by sector and then summarized, presented
in Table 1.

The corporate/business sector has benefited from the most research on data breach
management. More than half of the relevant papers found, focused on the cost of data breaches to
a company. Corporate data breaches are particularly important to understand because they tend
to be extremely public and have a direct relationship with a company's reputation. Within a
business, there are many parties that can be affected by a data breach such as consumers of the
product or service, the business entity itself and the internet security developers. The cost of a
data breach is easily quantifiable due to publicly available stock prices per company. Most of the
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papers found that data breaches had a negative, statistically significant impact on the market
values of a company (Acquisti, Friedman & Telang, 2006; Gatzkaff & McCullough, 2010;
Cavusoglu, Mishra & Raghunathan, 2004; Goel & Shawky, 2009; Garg, Curtis & Harper, 2003).
Most papers find that the market value of a company is only impacted directly after a breach.
More specifically in research conducted by Kevin Gatzlaff and Kathleen McCullough, they
found that 40 days directly after a breach, the market values tend to return to pre-breach levels
(Gatzkaff & McCullough, 2010). Another paper found that two days after a security breach, a
firm, on average, loses 2.1% of their market value (Cavusoglu, Mishra & Raghunathan, 2004).
And similarly, research was conducted to find that companies average about a 1% loss in market
value after a data breach (Goel & Shawky, 2009). While the business entities themselves were
found to have a negative loss to market value, the research found that security developers’
market value was positively impacted in the timeframe directly after a data breach. One study
found that, on average, the developers receive a 1.36% increase in market value in the two days
directly after a breach (Gatzkaff & McCullough, 2010). Research conducted by Ashish Garg,
Jeffrey Curtis, and Hilary Harper found security companies’ market value was positively
impacted by a data breach (Garg, Curtis & Harper, 2003). Data breaches to firms with higher
market-to-book ratios tend to have larger negative returns while firm size and subsidiary status
also play a role in mitigating the negative effects of a breach (Gatzkaff & McCullough, 2010).
The study by Hovav & D'Arcy, (2003) contradicts the above findings and reports that in general,
the market does not penalize companies for an attack. However, they did find that the market
tends to react more toward interest specific companies (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003). Overall,
consensus shows that data breaches negatively impact businesses.
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Data breaches in the healthcare sector were second most prevalent behind corporate
breaches. However, most articles tend to look at technical methodologies for improving data
security in the healthcare field. Understanding data breaches in this field is important because
medical information is highly sensitive to the individual and can do a lot of damage, financially.
For example, insurance information combined with medical information can be used to file
claims and thus contribute to insurance fraud (Appari & Johnson, 2010). One study proposed a
technical solution to malicious insiders modifying patient data. They suggested using a threetiered method of a watermarking module, logging module and security module hoping to limit
insider attacks in the healthcare industry (Garkoti, Peddoju & Balasubramanian, 2014).
Regulation plays a vital role in all aspects of the healthcare industry, however, after the passage
of reporting legislation the number of incidents, reported increased (Collins, Sainato & Khey,
2011). This is beneficial for the future because once incidents are reported, they can be
researched to identify preventative measures to data breaches in the future. The current
healthcare industry research focuses on technical preventative measures more than identifying
the root cause of data breaches.

Both the government and education sectors, severely lack research. The public sector
tends not to be researched as much, compared to the private sector, perhaps because it is harder
to quantitatively measure a breach and the associated damage. However, it is important to look at
government data breaches because governments, at the state and federal levels, hold an immense
amount of varying types of data. A current study on government data breaches found that human
and software incompetence were the most common breach type. However, it is difficult to
understand how often these occur because there is no unified reporting system (Froomkin, 2009).
In the education sector, universities and other educational institutions hold personal data on
6

students, faculty, and alumni. However, in a recently completed study, a slight decrease in the
number of overall incidents was found (Collins, Sainato & Khey, 2011). Similar to the healthcare
industry, the education sector has no definitive way of reporting breaches, making it difficult to
fully understand data breaches in this sector. Because there is a lack of research in both sectors, it
identifies a gap on this topic. Consequently, this honors thesis will focus on education sector data
breaches.

Table 1: A Summary of Related Studies
Sector
Healthcare

Title
"Detection of
Insider Attacks
in CloudBased
e-Healthcare
Environment"

Business
(Financial)

“Effectiveness
of Cyber
Security
Regulations in
the US
Financial
Sector: A Case
Study”

Business

Issues
Malicious insiders
modify the patient data
which creates false data.
The overarching issues
include privacy,
reliability, and security.

Data breaches are more
prevalent in the financial
sector despite having
cybersecurity regulations.
To address this gap,
regulation and actual
practices need to be
researched and addressed
along with defining
where the breaches come
from.
“The Economic Information security
Cost of Publicly breaches are ubiquitous
Announced
therefore understanding
Information
public sentiment is
Security
crucial. Data breaches
Breaches:
pose a large risk to all
Empirical
businesses.
Evidence from
the Stock
Market”
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Findings/Solution
The proposed method
includes:
1. Watermarking
module
2. Logging module
3. Security module

Author
Garkoti, Peddoju,
and
Balasubramanian
(2014).

The major cause of the data Kurt and Butkovic
breaches were
(2015).
miscellaneous errors and
insider misuse. They found
different sub-sectors had the
same threat patterns with
different frequencies. There
was a large gap between
federal banking regulations
and recommended practices.
Breaches result in no
statistically significant loss
for an entire sample.
Breaches involving
unauthorized access to
customer personal data or
firm proprietary data result
in an average loss of firm
value of 5.5%. The highly
significant, negative market
reaction for information
security breaches with
unauthorized access to data.

Campbell, Gordon,
Loeb, and Zhou
(2003).

Government

“Government
Data Breaches”

Business

“Is there a Cost
to Privacy
Breaches? An
Event Study”

Business

“The Effect of
Data Breaches
on Shareholder
Wealth”

Business

“The Effect of
Internet
Security Breach
Announcements
on Market
Value: Capital
Market
Reactions for
Breached Firms
and Internet
Security
Developers”

Public sector data
breaches are not as
heavily researched or
investigated as much as
in the private sector.
Government data
breaches are important
because they hold many
different types of
information.
Data breaches can
negatively impact many
parties such as
consumers and
companies. It is
beneficial for a company
to understand the
associated cost of a data
breach to protect
themselves and
consumers.
Data breaches pose a
large risk to all
businesses, specifically
due to the personal
information they hold.
Businesses have large
associated costs with data
breaches.

The issue this study tries
to answer is the difficulty
of measuring the
associated costs of data
breaches. Businesses
hold an immense amount
of data and can
potentially be severely
damaged by a data
breach.
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They found that
human/software
incompetence was the
largest cause of government
data breaches. It is hard to
say how often these occur
because there is no unified
reporting system for the
government.

Froomkin (2009).

Through empirical analyses
and an event study, the
research showed a negative
and statistically significant
impact of data breaches on
the company's market value
on the day the breach had
been publicly exposed.

Acquisti, Friedman,
and Telang (2006).

The impact of a data breach
on shareholder wealth is
negative and statistically
significant. After 40 days, it
appears market value
returns to prebreach levels.
Firms with higher marketto-book ratios have higher,
negative returns with the
data breach. Firm size and
subsidiary status mitigate
the negative effects of the
data breach.
This study found that a
security breach
announcement is negatively
associated with the market
value of the firm. On
average the firms lost 2.1%
of their market value within
two days, post
announcement. The market
value of security developers
is positively associated with
a data breach

Gatzlaff and
McCullough (2010).

Cavusoglu, Mishra,
and Raghunathan
(2004).

Business

“Estimating the
Market Impact
of Security
Breach
Announcements
on Firm
Values”

Business

“Quantifying
the Financial
Impact of IT
Security
Breaches”

Business

“The Impact of
Denial-ofService Attack
Announcements
on the Market
Value of Firms”

Healthcare

“What Caused
the Breach? An
Examination of
Use of
Information
Technology and
Health Data
Breaches”

announcement. They
received an average,
abnormal return of 1.36%
during the two-day, postannouncement period.
Security breaches can
The results of this study
significantly damage
found that the
companies; their
announcement of a security
reputation can suffer, and breach has a significant
they can pay heavy,
negative impact on the
government driven fines. market value of the
company. The impact on the
firms was a loss of about
1% of the market value.
Data breaches continue
This study found that on
to happen at a rapidly
average, the loss to a
increasing rate and will
company was $17-28
always be a main concern million per incident. The
for all companies.
market reacted the most
severely to credit card
information theft. Denial-ofService incidents had a
larger negative impact on
share prices compared to
website defacements.
Security companies also are
positively impacted by
security breaches.
Security breaches have
This study found that in
been increasing in
general, the market does not
companies for years.
penalize companies for an
Assessing the impact of
attack. However, the market
security breaches is
does react and penalize
crucial for policymakers companies that are internet
when making security
specific, more than other
policies.
companies.
Data regarding a person’s This study found that 47.5%
health information is
of breaches affecting
highly sensitive. Thus, an individuals were from theft
increase in data breaches and second was from loss
of health information is
27.4%. For covered entities
not good and the cause of and business associates,
these breaches should be 20.2% were from
considered to help
unauthorized access or
prevent them in the
disclosure. Hacking/IT
future.
represented 7.1% of total
9

Goel and Shawky
(2009).

Garg, Curtis, and
Harper (2003).

Hovav and D’Arcy
(2003).

Wikina (2014).

Healthcare/
Education

“Organizational
Data Breaches
2005-2010:
Applying SCP
to the
Healthcare and
Education
Sectors”

In the healthcare field,
insurance policy
information can be used
to file claims and obtain
prescriptions.
Educational institutions
have millions of records
of student, faculty, and
alumni data.

Healthcare

Information
Security and
Privacy in
Healthcare:
Current State of
Research”

The healthcare industry
has formed an increasing
need for the transfer of
digital records which
makes it susceptible to
data breaches. The
sensitivity of healthcare
information makes it
extremely important to
be protected.

individuals and 8.6% for
covered entities and 13.1%
for business associates.
The passage of reporting
legislation within the
healthcare field increased
the number of incidents
reported. For educational
institution data breaches,
there is an overall decrease
in incidents. This study
suggests that since there is
no centralized reporting
database for all data
breaches it prevents a
definitive analysis.
This paper summarized the
current research in this area
and found many papers
proposing methodologies to
combat privacy in the
healthcare sector. For future
research, the paper suggests
considering internal factors
such as by organization
type. They also suggest
researching limits to be
placed on all types of users
who interact with the data.
This paper continues to go
into detail to identify the
gaps in current research.

Collins, Sainato, and
Khey (2011).

Appari and Johnson
(2010).

Hypothesis Development
There are many factors that determine whether an organization will experience a data
breached. Based on the literature reviewed, specifically for data breaches in business institutions,
most institutions were large, well-known firms. Perhaps they were breached due to their stature
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or they were breached for the sheer amount of records they hold. Due to the extensive research
on data breaches, it is predicted that universities with higher student enrollment are more likely
to be breached because they contain more personal information about a larger number of students
and employees. In essence, there is more data at larger universities thus, a higher chance of
breaching more personal data records. Below is the first hypothesis explored in this research.
H1 – Larger universities are more susceptible to a data breach.
Similar to larger organizations, the literature indicates that companies with strong
financial backgrounds tend to get breached more often. The research shows there are monetary
incentives to data breaches. Thus, it can be inferred that universities with financial prestige are
more likely to be breached due to the higher financial gain to a person with access to breached
data. For example, a university with higher average family income is more likely to be breached
due to the indication of larger amounts of funds associated with their Social Security number.
Below is the second hypothesis explored in this research.
H2 – Universities with more financial resources are more susceptible to a data
breach.
The previous research studies conducted in the healthcare industry tend to focus on
solutions to data breaches due to the immense amount of private data held by these
organizations. These studies propose many solutions for data management, inferring the better
data management there is, the less likely a breach would occur. As a result, it can be predicted
that universities with tighter data protection policies are less likely to be breached because they
have more controls on student and faculty records. Below is the third hypothesis explored in this
research.
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H3 – Universities with stricter data protection policies are less susceptible to a
data breach.

Methodology
Secondary data was used to examine the aforementioned hypotheses. Specifically, data
from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse was used to gain knowledge about all data breaches reported
from 2005 through 2017. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a nonprofit, consumer education
organization that seeks to bring attention to all privacy-related issues (Data Breaches n.d.). Data
can be downloaded in the form of an Excel document based on the type of breach, organization
type, and year. For this study, all types of data breaches were downloaded from 2005 through
2017 for the education sector. The second source of data came from College Scorecard, a data
collection program run by the U.S. Department of Education from 1996 to 2016 for all
undergraduate degree-granting institutions (College Scorecard Data n.d.). This organization
reports all data collected via their website. The data collected contains attributes about all
institutions. College Scorecard breaks up their attributes by the following, overarching
identifiers, academics, admissions, costs, student body, financial aid, competition and retention,
earnings, repayment, and school. Each overarching identifier then breaks down into descriptive
measurements related to the broad identifier.
Once the above data sheets were downloaded, they were cleaned. Cleansing and
preparation for analysis were all done via Excel. For major formatting issues for the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse data, VBA macros were recorded and looped through each record to
prepare for analysis. Each record was then identified to ensure non-postsecondary institutions
were deleted from the sample. Descriptions of each breach were reviewed to identify what type
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of data was stolen. The descriptions were searched by the following keywords: Social Security,
financial, medical, phone, email, address, driver’s license, credit card, debit card, and password.
Dummy variables were created for each keyword, with a one (1) indicating that type of data was
exposed and a zero (0) indicating that type of data was not exposed. One record could have
multiple exposures to the previous keywords. The College Scorecard data required less
cleansing. However, each attribute on the College Scorecard data was identified as relevant to
the topic, if deemed irrelevant, the attribute column was then deleted. After the datasets were
cleaned and prepared for analysis, they were merged using a unique identifier; OPEID (Office of
Postsecondary Education Identification. This eight-digit identifier is the OPEID number created
and assigned by the U.S Department of Education (Department of Defense n.d.). Each branch of
any university has their own unique OPEID, making it the best unique identifier for this research.
Once these datasets were merged, a breached column was added. This column was a dummy
variable indicating whether a university was breached (1) or not breached (0).
After merging and cleansing the data set, descriptive statistics were computed via Excel,
to better understand the data. A visualization software, Tableau, was used to create graphic
representations of how, what, where and when data breaches occurred. Once the dataset was
better understood, IBM’s statistical software, SPSS Statistics, was used to create a correlation
matrix to understand the relationships between the variables. Thereafter, a logistic regression was
conducted to test the hypotheses. The findings from the associated analysis are presented in the
paragraphs that follow.

Findings
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This section will describe the full sample of data as well as a subsample of the breached
universities. The College Scorecard and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse datasets were merged,
resulting in a total of 7,594 total records. Of these records, 604 were breached universities. To
further understand the full sample, each university was categorized into small, medium, and
large. Small universities include all universities with student enrollments below 5,000. Medium
universities have student enrollments between 5,001 and 15,000. Large universities have student
enrollments greater than 15,001. For the breached sample, there are the most instances of large
universities (285) and a close second of medium-sized institutions (206). For the full sample of
data, almost half of the records are small universities (49.92%). This could be due to the larger
number of smaller universities in the United States than larger universities. The table below
shows the number of instances, as well as percentages, for each size categorization of the
breached universities, as well as the full sample of data.
Table 2: Data Breach Instances per University by Size

Small
Medium
Large
No Data

Breach
Instances
%
100
16.56%
206
34.11%
285
47.19%
13
2.15%

Full Sample
Instances
%
3791
49.92%
1095
14.42%
1972
26.42%
736
9.69%

To continue understanding the full sample of data, the location of each university was
explored. The data was examined first by state and then by region. The regions include the
Northeast (CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VA, VT, WV) the Southeast (AL,
FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN) the Southwest (AR, LA, NM, OK, TX) the West (AK, AZ, CA,
CO, HI, ID, MT, OR, NV, WA, WY, UT) the Midwest (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE,
OH, SD, WI) . By state, California has the most breach instances as well as the most instances

14

for the full sample. Wyoming has no instances for the breach set of data, while Alaska has the
least amount of instances for the full sample. For the breach instances, the West region has the
largest number of breaches (160), while the Southwest has the least (48). For the full sample
data, the Northeast has the most instances (1,868) while the Southwest has the least (901). The
tables below show the location of breach instances as well as full sample data instances.
Table 3: Breach Instances by State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Breach
Full Sample
Instance
%
Instance
%
8 1.33%
96 1.26%
2 0.33%
9 0.12%
5 0.83%
133 1.75%
2 0.33%
92 1.21%
90 14.95%
770 10.14%
17 2.82%
125 1.65%
18 2.99%
97 1.28%
4 0.66%
19 0.25%
2 0.33%
25 0.33%
25 4.15%
441 5.81%
15 2.49%
182 2.40%
6 1.00%
25 0.33%
4 0.66%
41 0.54%
15 2.49%
289 3.81%
23 3.82%
169 2.23%
15 2.49%
90 1.19%
8 1.33%
99 1.30%
11 1.83%
105 1.38%
4 0.66%
128 1.69%
4 0.66%
41 0.54%
4 0.66%
96 1.26%
20 3.32%
195 2.57%
15 2.49%
210 2.77%
5 0.83%
155 2.04%
3 0.50%
65 0.86%
13 2.16%
190 2.50%
7 1.16%
32 0.42%
5 0.83%
51 0.67%
7 1.16%
45 0.59%
4 0.66%
41 0.54%
8 1.33%
165 2.17%
15

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

7
41
18
1
32
7
10
21
1
7
1
13
28
5
3
22
7
2
7
0

1.16%
6.81%
2.99%
0.17%
5.32%
1.16%
1.66%
3.49%
0.17%
1.16%
0.17%
2.16%
4.65%
0.83%
0.50%
3.65%
1.16%
0.33%
1.16%
0.00%

51
468
205
30
355
149
93
405
26
110
31
185
481
80
27
188
127
75
116
11

0.67%
6.16%
2.70%
0.40%
4.68%
1.96%
1.22%
5.33%
0.34%
1.45%
0.41%
2.44%
6.33%
1.05%
0.36%
2.48%
1.67%
0.99%
1.53%
0.14%

Table 4: Breach Instances by State

The Northeast
The Southeast
The Southwest

Breach
Instance
154
100
48

%
25.58%
16.61%
7.97%

Full Sample
Instance %
1,868
24.60%
1,389
1829%
901
11.87%

The West
The Midwest

160
132

26.58%
21.93%

1,491
1,686

19.64%
22.20%

To further understand the breached data, visualizations were constructed. As mentioned
above, out of 604 breached observations, California had the largest number of data breaches (90)
with New York just below California, at 41 data breaches. This can be explained due to the
number of universities in each state, California has the most universities in the United States thus
it would be expected that California has the most data breaches. It appears there is a direct
correlation between the number of universities in each state and the number of data breaches in
16

each state. On the contrary, Virginia holds the most total records breached (353,923), meaning
the most amount of data was breached there. Connecticut is behind Virginia at 112,761 records
breached from 2005 to 2017. This is more difficult to explain given that there is no correlation
between the number of universities in each state and the total number of records breached in each
state. Below is a graphical representation of location with respect to data breaches, the darker the
shading in a state represents a higher number of data breaches while a larger circle on a state
represents a higher number of total records breached.

Figure 1: Number of Breaches and Total Number of Records Breached by State

After understanding where data breaches tend to take place, the timing of breaches was
explored. More specifically, the time the data breach was announced and made public. In terms
of years, the occurrence of data breaches appears to be decreasing however, the total number of
records breached per year does not have the same dramatic reduction as the occurrence of data
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breaches. This indicates that although data breaches as a whole are decreasing, the number of
records breached during a single breach is larger. After analysis of data breach announcements
per month, most announcements were made in June (67) followed by January (57). Lastly, in
terms of days, the company announcement days are typically announced on Friday's (144).
Perhaps giving the weekend as a buffer from public scrutiny.
Table 5: Number of Data Breaches and Total Records by Year
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Number of Data
Breaches
62
83
82
76
51
54
46
59
32
21
10
12
11
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Total Records
Breaches
62,578
64,056
48,247
107,528
100,005
99,494
244,990
135,175
160,090
43,988
1,013
238
51

Figure 2: Number of Breaches per Month

After understanding where the breaches happened and when it is important to examine
how breaches occur and what type of data is stolen. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse breaks up data
breach announcements by the type of breach. There are eight types of breach categories. They
include, payment card fraud, hacking or malware, insider, physical loss, portable device, a
stationary device, unintended disclosure and unknown (Data Breaches n.d.). In this dataset, most
breaches originate from hacking or malware (39.24% or 237 breaches) followed by unintended
disclosures (28.64% or 173 breaches). It is important for institutions to understand that 31.45%
of all data breaches originate internally, whether through a malicious insider or an unintended
disclosure situation.

19

Figure 3: Types of Breaches

At universities, faculty, students, and alumni are the most interested in what learning the
type of their data that is prone to a breach. After conducting analysis, Social Security numbers
are most likely to be stolen; out of 604 data breaches, 427 of them exposed Social Security
numbers, followed by personal data (193) and addresses (168).
Figure 5: Types of Data Exposed
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5.1 Correlation Analysis
The College Scorecard database allowed for the identification of multiple variables to test
the hypothesized relationships. Table 6 shows the variables that were used in the study. The
variables associated with university size in H1 are Size and Main Campus, while those associated
with data protection policies suggested in H2 are Privacy Suppressed Instances and Privacy
Suppressed. The remaining variables capture the financial dimension mentioned in H3.
Table 6: Variable Definitions
Variable
Breach

Size

Main Campus

Privacy Suppressed

Privacy Suppressed
Instances
Faculty Salary
High Income Students

Average Family Income
Median Family Income

Description
A binary variable that reflects
whether or not a university has
been breached. (1=True; 0=False).
A variable indicating total
enrollment of undergraduate,
degree-seeking students.
A binary variable that reflects
whether or not the campus is the
main campus. (1=True, 0=False)
A binary variable that reflects
whether or not a university
suppresses data for privacy
purposes. (1=True, 0=False).
A variable indicating the number
of data elements are suppressed by
a university.
A variable indicating the median
faculty salary of the university.
Number of Students from
households earning $110,001 or
higher.
A variable indicating the average
family income at the university.
A variable indicating the median
family income at the university.
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Used to Test
Hypothesis
n/a

H1

H1

H2

H2

H3
H3

H3
H3

The correlations confirm the hypotheses previously stated. As shown below, the size and
main campus variables are positively correlated to the breach variable. Larger universities hold
more faculty, student and alumni data proving that the more records a university holds, the more
likely they are to be breached. In addition, monetary variables such as high-income students,
faculty salary, and median and average family income show significance, which supports the
second hypothesis (H2) stated above. It is more valuable for the entity committing the breach to
gain data from individuals with higher net worth, as the correlation shows, the higher amount of
family income and faculty salary, the more likely a data breach will occur at that university.
Lastly, the correlation matrix indicates a negative correlation between a data breach and a
university that takes action protecting faculty and student records, this shows support for the
third hypothesis stated (H3). Similarly, the more data elements a university protects, the less
likely a breach will occur. This indicates that universities should not only be taking actions to
secure privacy but also to ensure the most amount of data possible is suppressed.
Table 7: Correlation Matrix
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1) Breached

1

(2)Size

.448**

1

(3)Main Campus

.110**

.182**

1

(4)Privacy Suppressed Instances

-.137**

-.261**

.308**

1

(5)Privacy Suppressed

-.144**

-.316**

.317**

.376**

1

(6)High Income Students

.217**

.130**

.337**

.282**

.219**

1

(7)Average Family Income

.249**

.211**

.206**

-.199**

.039**

.983**

1

(8)Median Family Income

.229**

.207**

.210**

-.190**

.049**

.966**

.977**

1

(9) Faculty Salary

.342**

.404**

.229**

-.073**

-.051**

.569**

.562**

.519**

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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(9)

1

5.2 Logistic Regression
To assess the influence of independent variables on breaches, a logistic regression model
was created. Recall that H1 predicted that the larger the university, the more susceptible it will be
to data breach, while H2 predicted that universities with more financial resources are more
susceptible to a data breach, and that H3 predicted that universities with stricter data protection
policies are less susceptible to a data breach. In the preceding correlation analysis, multiple
variables were used to capture the various dimensions (i.e., University Size, Data protection
Policy Strictness and University Financial Resources) introduced in the hypotheses. However,
given that multiple variables seek to explain the same dimension including each variable in the
logistic regression is likely to cause parameter estimates to be inaccurate due to multicollinearity.
Therefore, principal components analysis (PCA) was used as method of data reduction prior to
creating the logistic regression model.
The PCA extracted 3 components with eigenvalues above 1. These three factors collectively
account for 79.90% of the variance. Table 8 shows the component loadings and cross-loadings.
Component 1 represents each of the financial resources of a university while component 2 and 3
represent Data Protection Policies and the university size respectively.
Table 8: Rotated Component Matrix

High Income Students
Average Family Income
Average Family Income
Faculty Salary
Privacy Suppressed
Privacy Suppressed Instances
Size
Main Campus

1
0.970
0.963
0.952
0.623
0.079
0.251
0.075
0.136

Component
2
3
0.169
0.076
0.199
0.110
0.206
0.086
-0.078
0.510
0.821 -0.058
0.699
0.029
-0.443
0.770
0.440
0.765
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Using the components, the following logistic regression model was created.
Breach = β0+ β1*Financial Resources + β1*Data Protection Policies + β1*University Size
The proportion three predictor variables explain a considerable portion (Nagelkerke R
Square = 36.3%) of the variance in the dependent variable. The results for the logistic regression
are shown below. Based on these results, each of the hypotheses are supported. Specifically,
increasing university size increases the odds of being breached. Thus, H1 is supported. Increasing
financial resources increases the odds of being breached. Thus, H2 is supported. Finally,
suppressing data or having stricter data protection policies decreases the odds of being breached.
Thus, H3 is supported.

Table 9: Logistic Regression Results
Financial Resources
Data Protection Policies
University Size
Constant

B
0.788

S.E.
0.060

Wald
172.162

-0.421

0.076

1.211

0.085

-3.015

df
1

Sig.
0.000

30.559

1

0.000

201.819

1

0.000

0.094 1023.448

1

0.000

Discussion
After conducting analysis, there were many interesting observations. For example, there
appears to be a level of “prestige” that data hackers are after. As the correlation matrix shows,
the higher average faculty salary, the more likely a data breach will occur. It can be assumed that
higher faculty salaries could indicate more internal resources the university has, thus the more
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money a university has to pay salaries. Similarly, on the external side of a university, the higher
median family income indicates higher net worth for the student. Meaning their personal
information such as Social Security numbers are of more worth to a hacker. It is of more worth
to a hacker to steal an identity because more money in bank accounts and higher credit scores
make it easier to use monetary funds as well as apply for credit cards, etc. Overall, it appears that
universities with more financial resources are more susceptible to a data breach.
Another interesting observation pertains to when universities announce a data breach.
After analysis of the months in which data breaches are announced, it appears that they are
typically announced when students are out of school. During Winter break (December and
January), during Spring break (March) and during the first month of school after graduation
(June) more data breach announcements are made. This could indicate two scenarios; the first
that universities wait to announce data breaches to avoid any public or internal scrutiny from
faculty and students. The next scenario could be that universities do not find the breach until
students are away from the universities because they are typically busier during the times
students are in session.
Implications
After analyzing the data, there are many key takeaways that universities and students
should understand. For example, a university is more likely to be breached if it is a larger
university. Perhaps due to their well-known image or the immense about of data held within
large universities. It can be assumed the entity breaching the universities wants as many personal
records as possible, therefore hacking a larger university is advantageous for them. The
correlation analysis also showed the type of ownership plays a factor in a data breach. If it is a
public university they are more likely to be breached. Larger, public universities are typically
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more well-known than smaller ones, indicating that well-known universities are more likely to be
breached. It is crucial for larger universities, more specifically large, public universities, to pay
attention to data security because size is the most significant variable when determining the
likelihood of a university data breach.
Many data breaches at universities stem from meagre data management practices. After
analysis of how data breaches occur, 31.45% of data breaches originate internally. More
specifically 28.64% originate from unintended disclosures or non-malicious internal
employee/student error. To combat this, training of university employees and students, on best
practices for data management, is essential. Employee’s need to know how to properly handle
student data to avoid accidentally sharing this information via internal or external servers.
Similar to some companies, universities could provide employees and new students with a
mandatory online data management course. This would provide them with knowledge on how to
appropriately handle personal information as well as how to handle suspicious, external
materials, such as phishing emails.
Social Security numbers are the most stolen piece of personal data. Inferring that identify
theft is what malicious hackers are after. This could be detrimental to employees and students.
Specifically, more for students as they are most likely in their late teens early twenties and just
beginning their independent financial lives. For example, some students will be applying for
credit cards, renting apartments, or buying a car, all of which Social Security numbers and credit
score checks are imperative. Because of how private Social Security numbers are, universities
should seek effective ways of protecting Social Security numbers both for students and
employees. Perhaps they could suppress all data elements that hold Social Security numbers.
They could also allow only the last four digits of a Social Security number show on the
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employee or student record. In essence, all personal data needs to be carefully handled, however
Social Security numbers must be handled with very extreme and confidential care because they
are the most common data element hackers are looking for.
While breaches at universities seem to be decreasing, there are still multiple breaches that
occur every year. As technology continuously improves, more records are being stolen in each
single instance of a data breach. Universities must remain vigilant and continuously maintain
internal security systems as well as data management practices. It is also important to always be
aware of how data flows throughout an organization to be aware of who is seeing or handling the
different types of personal data.

Future Research
Although this study gives an in-depth introduction to the causes of data breaches in higher
education institutions, there is room for further research. For example, these are only
announcements; therefore, all the breached may not be covered. There may be universities that
have been breached and did not publicly disclose the breach that could have been excluded in the
sample. There is currently no federal regulation or reporting standard to hold every university to
the same reporting level. Therefore, finding alternative approaches to identifying breaches could
ensure breached universities are included and thus, would give better insights into the research
questions posed.
This study identifies the causes of a data breach however, it does not explore preventative
measures. An area for further research could be identifying preventative measures universities
currently have and looking at their associated data breaches to see if there are some preventative
measures that combat data breaches better than others. Similarly, research to understand the most
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essential preventative measures that need to be employed by different types of universities could
be undertaken. For example, smaller universities could implement different preventative
measures than larger universities, or after analysis, it could be found that university attributes do
not affect the type of data security measures put in place. Generally, after identifying what
causes data breaches, the next step would be to research how to prevent data breaches.
This study encompasses numerous types of data breaches. For further research, data breaches
could be broken up into malicious hackers, both internally and externally, compared to
unintended disclosures or breaches that occur unintentionally. This could help identify which
data elements universities should specifically focus on managing.
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